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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE FUTURE OF MASS SURVEILLANCE
Introduction
Peacetime espionage is by no means a new phenomenon in international relations.1 For as 
long as it has existed, it has been a prevalent method of gathering intelligence from afar, 
including through electronic means.2  However, foreign cyber surveillance on the scale 
revealed by Edward Snowden performed by the United States National Security Agency 
(NSA), the United Kingdom Government Telecommunications Headquarters (GCHQ) and 
their Five Eyes partners3 is a relatively recent activity. It can be defined as targeted and 
untargeted interception, bulk collection and storage of digital communications (content and 
metadata4). Foreign cyber surveillance comprises both transnational and extraterritorial 
surveillance.5 It may be conducted through the use of a variety of tools and programmes, 
such as PRISM and Tempora. The latter, predominantly used by the UK intelligence services, 
allows accessing of global communications through tapping of the fibre-optic underwater 
cables, giving GCHQ the ability to monitor up to 600 million communications every day.6 
1 Geoffrey B. Demarest, ‘Espionage in International Law’ (1996) 24 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 321, 326. Demarest defines espionage as ‘the consciously 
deceitful collection of information, ordered by a government or organization hostile to or 
suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by humans authorised by the 
target to do the collecting’. 
2 Russell Buchan, ‘The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage’ in 
Anna Maria Osula and Henry Roigas (eds), International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy and 
Industry Perspective (NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn 2016) 65-86.
3 Privacy International, ‘The Five Eyes’ < https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51>
The Five Eyes alliance is a secretive, global surveillance arrangement of states comprised of 
the United States National Security Agency, the United Kingdom Government 
Communications Headquarters, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment Canada, 
the Australian Signals Directorate and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security 
Bureau.
4 Privacy International, ‘Metadata’ < https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/53>
Metadata is information about the communication and include, inter alia, the location that 
the communication derived from, the device that sent it, the time it was sent and 
information about the recipient. 
5 Ashley Deeks, ‘An International Legal Framework for Surveillance’ (2015) 55 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 292-367, 299-300. Transnational surveillance refers to the 
surveillance of communications that cross state borders, including those that begin and end 
overseas but incidentally pass through the collecting state. Extraterritorial surveillance 
refers to the surveillance of communications that take place entirely overseas.  
6 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, ‘Mass Surveillance. Who is Watching the Watchers?’ (Doc 13734, 2015) 
6. 
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NSA’s PRISM enables direct access of the customer data from nine internet firms, including 
Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. 7
This article examines the legality of foreign cyber surveillance of NSA and GCHQ from 
the perspective of international human rights law, specifically the right to privacy under 
Article 17 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)8 and Article 8 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR).9 Since these activities are likely to 
continue, important questions regarding future protection of privacy of millions of people 
world-wide must be addressed both nationally and internationally. The United Nations (UN) 
and regional human rights bodies and organizations have voiced concerns, but these seem 
to fall on deaf ears. This article therefore explores the viability of a legally binding, 
multilateral cyber surveillance treaty to regulate the practices of intelligence gathering at 
home and abroad. Such a treaty, called the ‘intelligence Codex’ (the Codex), has recently 
been proposed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).10  It is a multilateral ‘no-spy’ regional instrument 
among European countries, which aims to lay down rules governing cooperation for 
purposes of the fight against terrorism and organized crime.11 The idea has been put 
forward to the ministers of the 47 Council of Europe member states, but has already met 
with  one rejection from the Netherlands. The Dutch government objected to the banning of 
economic and political espionage set out in the Codex, for being unrealistic and with a 
potential to ‘irresponsibly limit intelligence collection’.12
7 ibid.
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 17 provides
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary and unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attack’.
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR),  
art 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.
2. There shall be on interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well 
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
10 supra note 6, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2045 (21 April 
2015).
11 ibid, para 17.4.
12 Matthijs Koot, ‘Dutch Government Rejects Idea of No-Spy Agreements Between European 
Countries’ (13 March 2015)< https://blog.cyberwar.nl/2015/03/dutch-minister-of-the-
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This article takes a different view and considers the Codex as a step in the right 
direction. The issuing discussion is divided into five sections. Section one outlines the 
domestic legal bases authorising foreign cyber surveillance and demonstrates that they 
unjustly discriminate on the basis of nationality. Section two makes a case for the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties in the context of cyber surveillance 
abroad. Section three shows how cyber surveillance amounts to an interference with the 
right to privacy of communications and section four finds no justifications for the 
interference, as set out in Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8(2) ECHR. This leads to the inevitable 
conclusion in section five that foreign cyber surveillance should no longer be permitted to 
operate in an international regulatory legal vacuum. To that end, this section supports the 
idea of a legally binding agreement as proposed by the Council of Europe.
1. Cyber Surveillance Programmes and Their Domestic Legal Bases
The activities of NSA and GCHQ are secretive by definition. However, the global 
condemnation of the US and the UK sponsored surveillance has caused the US government 
to admit the existence of PRISM. Whilst the UK confirmed that it has been the recipient of 
data from PRISM via its intelligence sharing relationship with the US,13 the government has 
adopted a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy towards Tempora.14
PRISM operates pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).15 
This provision was introduced by the FISA Amendment Act (FAA) 2008, which revised the 
previous surveillance rules. The FAA adopts different approaches depending on whether the 
targets of surveillance are ‘United States persons’,16 or ‘non-United States’ persons17 and 
may be summarised as follows: (a) US persons can be targeted only upon showing a 
probable cause to believing that he/she is an agent of a foreign power, 18 whereas non-US 
persons can be targeted showing a lower ‘reasonable belief’ standard; (b) US persons may 
only be targeted if there is a judicial warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), whereas non-US persons can be targeted without FISC approved individual 
interior-rejects-eu-pace-proposal-omtzigt-of-anti-spy-treaty-between-european-
countries/>.
13 Liberty, ‘Liberty’s Evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Inquiry into 
Privacy and Security’ (February 2014) < https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/Liberty%20evidence%20to%20the%20ISC%20inquiry%20int
o%20privacy%20and%20security%20(Feb%202014).pdf>, 3.
14 ibid.
15 50 U.S.C § 1881(a).
16 50 U.S.C § 1881(c). United States persons are defined as American citizens or non-citizens 
who are legal permanent residents in the US.
17 50 U.S.C § 1881(a).
18 Richard A. Clarke et al, The NSA Report. Liberty and Security in the Changing World. The 
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (Princeton 
University Press 2013) 86-87.
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warrants; (c) the minimization requirements for communications of US persons would not 
extend fully to non-US persons located outside the US.19
The UK surveillance powers to intercept foreign communications are set out primarily in the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), soon to be replaced by the Investigatory 
Powers Bill.20 RIPA too makes a distinction, but between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
communications. ‘Internal interceptions’ may only be conducted on the basis of individual 
warrants,21 which must name, or describe a person, or single set of premises to be 
intercepted.22 Conversely, the interception of ‘external communications’,23 i.e. ‘means of 
communications sent or received outside the British Islands’,24 are  very loosely controlled.  
A warrant does not need to identify a specific person, or premises but must only contain the 
description of intercepted material. There is no upper limit to the number of external 
communications that may be intercepted on the basis of s8(4) RIPA and warrants granted 
pursuant to this section can last for either three, or six months and be renewed indefinitely. 
The discriminatory nature of s 702 FAA 2008 and s 8 RIPA 2000 is clear, but it is just a 
part of a wider US and its Five Eyes partners’ policy stance post 11 September 2001, which 
places emphasis on citizenship as a basis for fundamental rights.25  This therefore requires 
that the rights of non-citizens be clarified under international law. The fundamental 
recognition that all persons by virtue of their essential humanity are equal and should enjoy 
all human rights without discrimination is contained in Article 2(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;26 Articles 227 and 2628  of the ICCPR;  Articles 129 and 230 of the 
International Covenant of on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1976 (ICESCR); and Article 
1431 of the ECHR. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), a body of independent experts 
that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR by its state parties, is tasked with providing 
19 ibid.
20 UK Parliament, ‘Investigatory Powers Bill. Explanatory Notes’ (18 May 2016) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-
2017/0002/en/17002en03.htm>
21 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s 5.
22 RIPA 2000 s 8(1).
23 RIPA 2000 s 8(4)-(6).
24 RIPA 2000 s 20.
25 Marko Milanovic, ‘Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 1: Do Foreigners Deserve 
Privacy?’ (EJIL: Talk! 25 November 2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-
human-rights-part-1-do-foreigners-deserve-privacy/>. 
26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR) art 2(1). 
27 ICCPR supra note 8, art 2(1).
28 ICCPR supra note 8, art 26. 
29 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS 993 (ICESCR) art 1. 
30 ICESCR, ibid art 2.
31 ECHR, supra note 9, art 14.
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a guide to the Covenant’s interpretation. This the Committee does through issuing non-
country specific and non-legally binding general comments, with the purpose  to, inter alia, 
promote the effective implementation of the Covenant, clarify its requirements and 
stimulate the activities of state parties as well as international organizations in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.32  In  General Comment No. 15 in relation to the 
rights under the ICCPR, the HRC explained that the rights in the Covenant apply to everyone, 
irrespective of their nationality and the general rule is that each one of these rights must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.33 The ICESCR likewise 
established that governments shall take progressive measures to the extent of available 
resources to protect the rights of everyone regardless of their citizenship.34 Thus, the 
fundamental principle dictates that human rights are presumptively owned to citizens and 
non-citizens alike, unless a particular treaty (or customary rule) allows for differential 
treatment. Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR permit states to draw distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens, but only with respect to three categories of rights, namely political 
rights, freedom of movement and economic rights in developing countries.35 Thus, under 
Article 25 ICCPR, the right to participate in public affairs, to vote, to hold office and to have 
access to public services is guaranteed to citizens only.36 Similarly, Article 12(4) ICCPR 
provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country, 37 
whilst the ICESCR Article 2(3) allows developing counties to ‘determine to what extent they 
would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-
nationals’.38 States therefore may not draw distinction between citizens and non-citizens as 
to social and cultural rights, with exception of the right to public participation and of 
movement. Having said that, international law, as well as state practice consistently 
sanctions discrimination and distinctions on the basis of nationality, which means some 
discrimination on these grounds would be permissible.39 The HRC in its General Comment 
No. 18 clarified this by stating that ‘not every differentiation of treatment will constitute 
discrimination, if the criteria for such a differentiation are reasonable and objective and if 
the aim is to achieve a purpose, which is legitimate under the [International] Covenant [of 
Civil and Political Rights]’40 and is proportional to the achievement of that objective.41 The 
‘objective and reasonable justification’ is also a criteria that the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) requires a state to satisfy in order to show that the difference in treatment 
32 Ghandi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication: Law 
and Practice (Ashgate Publishing 1998) 25.
33 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 15. The Position of Aliens under the Covenant’ (1986) UN 
Doc HRI/Gen/1/Rev.9/(Vol.1) para 1-2. 
34 ICESCR, supra note 29 art 2.
35 supra note 33 para 18.
36 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 25. 
37 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 12(4). 
38 ICESCR, supra note 29 art 2(3). 
39 supra note 33 para 23-30.
40 UNRC, ‘General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination’ (1989) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
para 13.
41 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Report by Special Rapporteur David Weissbrodt 2003/23’ 
(2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23.
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was not discriminatory. In Burden v United Kingdom42 the Strasbourg Court held that ‘a 
difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; 
in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised. The Contracting State enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to 
what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment’.43
States are obliged to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do 
not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of nationality and the principle of non-
discrimination must be observed in all matters, in particular in those concerning liberty, 
security and dignity of the person, equality before the courts and due process of law, as well 
as international cooperation in judicial and police matters.44 In guaranteeing certain rights to 
citizens only, the US and the UK laws breach the provisions of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment under the ICCPR and the ECHR, which as will be shown below cannot be justified 
on objective and reasonable grounds. Indeed, ‘the unique position of the United States (and 
the United Kingdom) with regards to the physical infrastructure of the internet and the fact 
that the private companies based in the US collect and store huge amounts of data of 
persons residing anywhere in the world makes the exclusion of “non-US [and UK] persons” 
from any legal protection against mass surveillance simply intolerable-it may well lead to 
the destruction of the internet as we know it’.45 This reinforces the need to broaden the 
scope of the extraterritorial application of these states’ human rights obligations to apply to 
foreign cyber surveillance, discussed next.
2. Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR and ECHR and Cyber Surveillance
Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR apply extraterritorially, which means that states must 
respect the right to privacy whenever individuals are within their territory as well as their 
jurisdiction.46 However, the US has long denied that it has obligations to respect and protect 
human rights outside its borders (territory), despite views to the contrary expressed by 
most international human rights courts and bodies. 
The jurisdictional scope of application of the ECHR and the ICCPR are set out in 
Article 147 and Article 2(1)48 respectively. The US has consistently held a narrow stance 
42 Burden v United Kingdom (App no 133378/05) (2008) ECHR 357 [GC].
43 ibid, para 60.
44 supra, note 41 para 28.
45 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Mass Surveillance-
Report of the Parliamentary Assembly’ (2015) Doc 13734 45.
46 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Privacy Rights in the Digital Age. A Proposal for a New 
General Comment on the Right to Privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights: A Draft Report and General Comment by the American Civil 
Liberties Union’ (2014) <https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-report-iccpr-
web-rel1.pdf> 28.
47 ECHR, supra note 9 art 1:
‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.’ 
48 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 2(1):
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regarding extraterritorial application of the Covenant since its statement to the Human 
Rights Committee in 1995.49 This position has been based on Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT), which requires that treaties should be read 
‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning …of [their] terms’. 50 The US approach is that 
obligations under the ICCPR will only arise if both conditions in Article 2(1) ICCPR are 
satisfied, that is an individual must be ‘within its territory’ and ‘subject to its jurisdiction’, 
which rules out the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR altogether. This interpretation, 
in particular in relation to foreign cyber surveillance, must be rejected in favour of the more 
expansive view taken by international bodies, according to which a state must ensure 
human rights within its territory and anywhere it has ‘effective control’ of either the 
territory, or a person. There are number of reasons for this. First, the narrow approach 
favoured by the US has been repeatedly criticized by the Human Rights Committee in its 
1994,51 2006 and 2014 reports.52 Secondly, the HRC endorsed the extraterritorial application 
of the Covenant, also relying on Article 31 VCLT, but unlike the US, the Committee invoked 
its ‘object and purpose’ to determine that the conditions contained in Article 2(1) ICCPR 
should not be determined conjunctively, but disjunctively. According to its General 
Comment No. 31, states must respect and ensure the rights laid down by the Covenant to 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.
49 UNHRC, ’Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting’ (24 April 1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR/1405. 
The US Government’s position was made clear in para 20:
The Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial application (…) Article 2 of 
the Covenant expressly stated that each State party undertook to respect and ensure 
the rights recognized ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’. That dual requirement restricted the scope of the Covenant to persons 
under the United States jurisdiction and within United states territory.
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969) (1969) 1155 UNTS 
331 (VCLT) art 31(1).
51 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/40 para 284:
[the HRC] does not share the view [of the US government] that the Covenant lacks 
extraterritorial reach under all circumstances [because] such a view is contrary to 
the consistent interpretation of the Committee … that in special circumstances, 
persons may fall under the subject-matter jurisdiction of a State Party even when 
outside that State’s territory.
52 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the US Report Under the ICCPR’ (2006) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3; UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the US Report Under the ICCPR’ 
(2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3. Both reports state in para C.4 that:
The Committee regrets that the State Party continues to maintain its position that 
the Covenant does not apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but
outside its territory, despite the contrary interpretation of article 2(1) supported by 
the Committee’s established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice and State practice.
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anyone within the power or effective control of that state party, even if not situated within 
its territory.53 Additionally, the HRC considered that ‘state parties are required to give effect 
to the obligations under the Covenant in good faith’ pursuant to Article 26 of the VCLT.54 The 
HRC adopted this expansive approach in several cases, such as Lopez Burgos v Uruguay,55 
Montego v Uruguay56  and in Munaf v Romania.57  Recently, the HRC in its General Comment 
No. 3558 concerning Article 9 ICCPR59 confirmed that ‘[s]tate [p]arties have an obligation to 
respect and ensure the rights under Article 9  to all persons who may be within the territory 
and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction’.60 When considering the US cyber surveillance 
activities in its 2014 report, the HRC clearly found that foreign surveillance implicates ICCPR, 
stating the the US  should ‘take all necessary measures to ensure that its surveillance 
activities, both within and outside the United States, conform to its obligations under the 
Covenant, including Article 17.’61 Thirdly, the established jurisprudence of other 
international courts, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court 
of Human Rights also support the wider, extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. 
In the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories Advisory Opinion62 and the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo,63 the ICJ concluded that the ICCPR was applicable ‘in respect to acts done by a 
State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’.64 By far the most developed 
53 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 31. The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1326 May 2004.
54 VCLT, supra note 50 art 26.
55 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay (1979) UNHRC Communication No 52/1979 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979. The HRC held that state parties are liable for the actions of their 
agents on foreign territory and stated that states must respect and ensure the Covenant 
rights to all persons who may be within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction.
56 Montego v Uruguay (1981) UNHRC Communication No 106/1981 UN Doc Supp No 40 (A 
138/40). This case concerned a refusal of the Uruguay authorities to renew the passport of 
an Uruguay citizen residing in Germany. The Committee found that in the case of citizens 
residing abroad Article 2(1) cannot be interpreted as limiting the obligations of Uruguay 
under Article 12(2) (free movement) to citizens within its own territory. 
57 Munaf v Romania (2006) UNHRC Communication No 1539/06 UN Doc CCPR/C/96/D. The 
Committee observed that a state may be liable for human rights violations that occur even 
outside its area of control, as long as that state’s activity was ‘a link in a causal chain’ 
bringing about the human rights violations.
58 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 35. Article 9-Liberty and Security of Person’ (2014) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/35.
59 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 9. 
60 supra, note 58 para 63.
61 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of 
America’ (2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 para 22. 
62 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ Reports 163.
63 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Uganda) (Request for the Indication for Provisional Measures: Order) [2000] ICJ 
Reports 111. 
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and varied jurisprudence on the issue of extraterritoriality however  is that of the ECtHR 
interpreting Article 1 ECHR. The approach taken by the Strasbourg Court in Al-Skeini v 
United Kingdom65 clarified its earlier stance on the issue.66 The Court reaffirmed two basic 
models of state jurisdiction: the spatial model (jurisdiction as effective overall control by a 
state over an area, or territory)67 and the personal model (jurisdiction as an exercise of 
authority, or control by state agents over an individual),68 emphasising however that 
extraterritorial application of ECHR can only be exceptional and needs to be justified by 
reference to general international law.69 Post Al-Skeini cases attest to a more expansive view 
towards the question of extraterritorial application of the Convention, with regards to both 
the personal (Jaloud v the Netherlands)70  and the spatial model (the so-called Nagorno-
Karabakh cases).71  These cases are a clear indication of the trend in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
towards clearer, more factual and importantly more permissive approach,72 which also is in 
line with other human rights bodies.73 
Neither the HRC, nor the ECtHR has yet pronounced directly on the extraterritorial 
application of the ICCPR and ECHR to cases of cyber surveillance.74 Nevertheless, they may 
64 supra, note 62 para 111; DRC v Congo, ibid.
65 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (App No 55721/07) [2011] ECHR 1093.
66 Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others (App No 52207/99) [2001] ECHR 890. The case 
concerned the violation of the right to life of victims of the 1999 NATO aerial bombings in 
Kosovo. The ECtHR held that the jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily territorial, 
thus resisting the extraterritorial application of ECHR, allowing however for one exception, 
namely the inhabitants of a territory being under the effective control of an ECHR 
contracting party (para 80). See also Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia (App No 
48787/99) (2005) 40 EHRR; Loizidou v Turkey (App No 15318/89) (1995) 23 EHRR 513; Issa 
and Others v Turkey (App No 31821/96) (2005) 41 EHRR 27.
67 supra, note 65 paras 138-139.
68 ibid, paras 133-137.
69 ibid.
70 Jaloud v the Netherlands (App No 47708/08) (2014). The ECtHR found that the victim fell 
within the personal jurisdiction of the Netherlands, despite the argument that that 
country’s forces acted under the operational control of the UK because he passed through a 
check point specifically set up for the purpose of asserting authority and control over 
persons during the military operations.
71 Chiragov and Others v Armenia (App No 13216/05) (2015); Sargsyan v Azerbaijan, (App No 
40167/06) (2015). The Court adopted an expansive approach when applying the spatial 
model in these two cases. In its evaluation of the evidence confirming Armenian control 
over the Nagorno-Karabakh for example, the Court found a high level of Armenian influence 
in the region (including military, political and financial) and consequently effective control 
over it.
72 Marko Milanovic, ‘Jurisdiction and Responsibility: Trends in the Jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court’, in Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc (eds), The ECHR and General 
International Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
73 UNHRC General Comment No. 35, supra note 58; UNHRC ‘Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America’, supra note 61.
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well be persuaded to do so, especially in the light of recent explicit acknowledgements from 
both the HRC and the UN General Assembly that extraterritorial surveillance raises human 
rights concerns. 75 In particular, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report on The 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age76  noted the circumstances when human rights obligations 
may be engaged  in the context of  extraterritorial surveillance. This will arise in relation to 
any person, irrespective of their nationality, or physical location whenever a state exercises 
effective control over the technical, or physical means through which privacy rights are 
interfered with, for example by direct tapping or penetration of the infrastructure, 
irrespective of whether or not the state exercise power or effective control over the 
individual rights bearer as such. 77 The US Upstream78 and the UK Tempora programmes are 
designed to do exactly that and therefore in all probability engage these countries’ 
obligations under ICCPR (UK and US) and ECHR (UK). The same applies to the US PRISM, as it 
allows to directly access the servers of third parties that physically control the data, 
including Google, Microsoft and Yahoo.  In addition Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC 
was clear on this point observing that ‘[state’s jurisdiction] is not only engaged where State 
agents place data interceptors on fibre-optic cables travelling through their jurisdictions, but 
also where a State exercises regulatory authority over the telecommunications or Internet 
Service Providers that physically control the data’.79
74 There are three currently pending cyber surveillance cases before the ECtHR, all alleging 
breach of Article 8 ECHR by GCHQ following Edward Snowden revelations- 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v UK (App No 62322/14);
Big Brother Watch and Others v UK (App No 58179/13);
10 Human Rights Organizations v UK (App No Index No IOR 60/1415/2015).
75 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the Forth Periodic Report of the United States of 
America’, supra note 61.
76 UNGA, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ UN Doc A/HRC/27/37 30 (2014).
77 ibid, para 34: 
[…] digital surveillance […] may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that 
surveillance involves the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation 
to digital communications infrastructure, wherever found, for example through 
direct tapping or penetration of that infrastructure. Equally, where the State 
exercises regulatory jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data, 
that State would have obligations under the Covenant.
78 The Washington Post, ‘NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables’ (2013) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-
seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html>. Upstream 
collection programmes allow access to very high volumes of data both inside and outside 
the US and has been described as the ‘collection of communications on fibre cables and 
infrastructure as data flows past’ and is conducted under the following four major 
surveillance programmes- Fairview, Blarney, Stormbrew and Oakstar. 
79 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms whilst Countering Terrorism Ben Emmerson QC’ (23 
September 2014) UN Doc A/69/397 para 41.
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3. Cyber Surveillance as an Interference with the Right to Privacy of Communications 
Article 17 ICCPR prohibits ‘arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, home or 
correspondence’80 and obliges all state parties to create legal frameworks for the effective 
protection of privacy including adequate complaint systems, as well as remedies for the 
violation of this right. The HRC  made it clear that ‘confidentiality of correspondence should 
be guaranteed de jure and de facto’. 81 Correspondence ‘should be delivered to the 
addressee without interception and without being opened or otherwise read’.82 The 
Committee’s interpretation of the scope of the term ‘correspondence’ clearly covers 
NSA/GCHQ cyber surveillance of digital communications, as the term includes all electronic 
communications, such as email,83 instant messages, together with telephonic and 
telegraphic communications.84 Electronic surveillance, wire-tapping and the recording of 
conversations is prohibited.85 In addition, the gathering and holding of personal information 
on computers, data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private 
individuals, must be subject to appropriate state regulation and safeguards.86 The HRC 
interpreted the phrase ‘interference’ broadly, to include any measure that either directly, or 
indirectly infringes on an individual’s privacy interests.87 For these reasons, it is very likely 
that both NSA and GCHQ surveillance practices interfere with privacy because the mere 
collection and storage of data, including that which is publically accessible, constitutes an 
interference falling within the ambit of Article 17 ICCPR. 
Similarly, Article 8 ECHR protects everyone’s private life, home and correspondence from 
interference by a public authority, except on specific grounds provided in subparagraph 2. 88 
The extent of interference with the right to privacy in the context of states’ secret 
surveillance operations has been subject to an extensive analysis of the ECtHR on a number 
of occasions. A series of early cases dealing with the interception of telephone 
conversations applying various surveillance techniques by law enforcement agencies helped 
to develop a number of principles. Such cases as Klass and Others v Germany,89 Malone v 
United Kingdom,90 Halford v United Kingdom91 and Liberty and Others v United Kingdom92 
80 ICCPR art 17, supra note 8.
81 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy). The Right to Respect of 
Privacy, Family, Home, and Correspondence and Protection of Honour and Reputation’ (8 
April 1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev para 8.
82 ibid.
83 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on Sweden’ (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6.
84 UNHRC General Comment No. 16, supra note 81 para 8.
85 ibid.
86 ibid, para 10.
87 UNHRC Tooten v Australia (Communication No 488/1992) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 
(1994). The HRC concluded that the continued existence of the challenged provisions of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code continuously and directly ‘interfered’ with the right to privacy, 
para 8.2.
88 ECHR art 8, supra note 9.
89 Klass and Others v Germany (App No 5029/71) (1978) 2 EHRR 214.
90 Malone v United Kingdom (App No 8691/79) (1985) 7 EHRR 14.
91 Halford v United Kingdom (App No 20605/92) (1997) 24 EHRR 523.
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established, inter alia, that wire tapping of telephone conversations, as well as the use of 
covert surveillance technologies invariably engages Article 8, since the notion of ‘private life’ 
and ‘correspondence’ extends to the interception of telephone communications and 
‘metering’ practices.93 In Liberty the ECtHR explicitly stated that e-mail communications are 
also included in the ambit of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’. 94 The Court also ruled on 
the collection and storage of personal data by public authorities.95 Additionally, in  Weber 
and Saravia v Germany96 and Kennedy v UK97  the ECtHR held that the legislation, which by 
its mere existence entails a threat of surveillance for all those, to whom it might be applied, 
impacted on freedom of communication between the users of the telecommunications 
services and thereby amounted in itself to an interference with the exercise of the rights 
under Article 8 ECHR.  Most recently, the ECtHR engaged with domestic mass surveillance 
regimes in Roman Zakharov v Russia98 and Szabo and Vissy v Hungary.99 In Zakharov, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the Russian system for permitting surveillance across 
mobile networks in the interests of crime prevention, which required the network operators 
to install equipment allowing the interception of all telephone communications without 
prior judicial authorisation, violated Article 8. Szabo concerned surveillance powers of the 
Hungarian intelligence agency contained in the Police Act 1994 (s 7/E(3)), including 
interception of electronic or computerised communications without the consent of the 
person concerned on anti-terrorist grounds. These powers were subject to ministerial, 
rather than judicial authorisation. They were not linked to a particular crime and required a 
warrant to relate only to premises, persons concerned, or ‘a range of persons’, being 
therefore potentially executable against any person. Given the fact that the scope of the 
measures could include virtually everyone in Hungary, that the ordering was entirely in the 
guise of the executive without an assessment of whether interception was strictly 
necessary, that new technologies enabled the Hungarian government to intercept vast 
amounts of data concerning even persons outside the original range of operations, together 
with an absence of any effective remedial measures, the Court concluded that there had 
been a violation of Article 8.100 Theses latest judgements reinforce the ECtHR antagonism 
towards mass surveillance and signal its willingness to take a hard line in the currently 
pending cases against the UK government, including the Big Brother Watch.101
92 Liberty and Others v United Kingdom (App No 58243/00) (2009) 48 EHRR 1.
93  supra, note 90. ‘Metering’ in Malone involved the use of a meter to register the number 
dialled, the time and duration of each telephone call.
94 supra note 92.
95 See for example: Leander v Sweden (App No 9248/81) (1987) 9 EHRR 433; S and M Marper 
v UK (App No 30562/04) (2008) ECHR 1581; Shimovolos v Russia (App No 30194/09) (2011).
96 Weber and Saravia v Germany (App No 54934/00) (2006).
97 Kennedy v the United Kingdom (App No 26839/05) (2010).
98 Roman Zakharov v Russia (App No 47143/06) (2015) ECHR 1065.
99 Szabo and Vissy v Hungary (App No 37138/14) (2016).
100 European Court of Human Rights Registry, ‘Hungarian Legislation on Secret Anti-Terrorist 
Surveillance Does not Have Sufficient Safeguards Against Abuse’ (2016) 
<http://statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/echr-case-SZAB-%20AND-VISSY-v-%20HUNGARY-
prel.pdf.>.
101 supra, note 74.
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4. Can Mass Cyber Surveillance Be Justified?
In one word-no. Any justification put forward by the US and UK authorities must satisfy the 
requirements of Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8(2) ECHR. Unlike Article 8(2), Article 17 does 
not provide specific grounds limiting the right to privacy. However, as other non-absolute 
rights, Article 17 may be limited by proportionate measures designed to achieve a valid 
aim.102  Based on the practice of the HRC,103 as well as the wording of Article 8(2) and its 
interpretation by the ECtHR, the test for permissible limitations boils down to three main 
criteria, namely (a) ‘in accordance with the law’; (b) legitimate aim and (c) necessity and 
proportionality. 
(a) In Accordance with the Law 
Article 17 ICCPR prohibits ‘unlawful’ interference, meaning that ‘no interference can take 
place except in cases envisaged by the law’,104  which itself must comply with the objectives 
of the Covenant105 and ‘be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to 
regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public. A law 
may not confer unfettered discretion.’106 The provision of ‘in accordance with the law’ in 
Article 8(2) ECHR similarly requires that surveillance measures must have ‘some basis in 
domestic law’, be accessible to the person concerned, be foreseeable as to its effects,107 as 
well as being relatively detailed.108 
The use of surveillance programmes, including Tempora do not meet these standards. First, 
there are very few states that have so far enacted primary legislation explicitly authorising 
such programmes.109 For example, there is no UK statute to date specifically authorising 
102 Sara Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press 2014) 538.
103 UNHRC General Comment No. 16, supra note 81 paras 3,4,8; UNHRC, ‘General Comment 
27. Freedom of Movement (Article 12)’ (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 paras 14-15; 
Tooten v Australia supra note 87 para 8.3.
104 UNHRC General Comment No. 16, supra note 81 para 10.
105 ibid para 3.
106 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 34. Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ 
(2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 para 25.
107 Zakharov v Russia, supra note 98.
108 ibid, para 231. Zakharov reiterated the Court’s requirements set out in its earlier 
jurisprudence, in such cases as Huvig v France (App No 11105/84) (1990) 12 EHRR528; Klass 
v Germany supra note 89; Amman v Switzerland (App No 27798/95) (2000) 30 EHRR 843; 
Weber v Germany supra note 96.  The domestic statute must specify: (a) the categories of 
people liable to interception; (b) the nature of the offences which may give rise to an 
interception order; (c) limits of its duration (d) the procedures to be followed for examining, 
using and storing the data obtained; (e) the precautions to be taken when communicating 
the data to other parties, and (f) circumstances in which data obtained may, or must be 
erased or destroyed.
109 Report of the Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson, QC supra, note 79 para 37.
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interception of communications involving the tapping of the undersea fibre-optic cables. 
RIPA, aimed at the interception of domestic and foreign telephone communications, has 
been simply adapted to the new reality of intercepting all internet traffic. So long as one end 
of a communication is outside the UK, RIPA warrants authorising ‘external’ communications. 
However, the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ communications in the context of 
digital communications is purely theoretical and makes no real difference in practice as to 
what information may be collected. As a result, the exact legal basis for these powers are 
unknown and not readily accessible, whilst their is vague and unforeseeable. The UK 
government has acknowledged in the 2014 litigation against it in the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal that it ‘considers that an “external communication” occurs every time a UK based 
person accesses a website located overseas, posts on a social media site overseas such as 
Facebook, uses overseas cloud storage or uses on overseas email provider such as Hotmail 
or Gmail. Searches on Google are counted as external communications.’110 Furthermore, the 
UK powers to bulk intercept external communications seem to have been used to monitor 
also domestic data. Indeed, at one point GCHQ was reportedly obtaining  85% of all UK 
domestic traffic, including internet, via the international cables (using Tempora).111 Secondly, 
thus far the UK government has not satisfactorily justified the difference in treatment when 
collecting ‘internal’ and ‘external’ communications to establish that the latter practice is not 
discriminatory in line with requirement of proportionality set out by the HRC in its General 
Comment No. 18112 and the ECtHR in Burden v UK.113 Therefore, the same principles 
regarding ‘in accordance with the law’ recently reiterated in Zakharov and Szabo in relation 
to domestic powers of surveillance must also apply to foreign, or external communications. 
On these bases alone, the continued practice of intercepting all external communications 
under RIPA fails this test, as there is no regard for the procedural safeguards against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities. For example, as bulk interception by its very 
nature does not specify the target, this breaches the obligation to identify the categories of 
people liable to interception and provides no limits on its duration. In Szabo the Courts 
specifically noted that under s 7/E it was possible for virtually any person in Hungary to be 
subjected to secret surveillance, as the legislation did not describe the categories of persons 
who in practice may be targeted. The only requirement was for the authorities to name the 
individuals, or the ‘range of persons’ to be intercepted to the responsible government 
minister, without demonstrating their actual, or presumed relation to any terrorist threat. 
Thirdly, The UK government has already been challenged on the legality of the interception 
of external communications based on Interception of Communications Act 1985 (ICA) in 
Liberty v UK.114 The ICA did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope, or manner of the 
110 Liberty v GCHQ [2014] UKIPT rib 13_77-H.
 <https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/The%20Intelligence%20Services%20open%20response%20t
o%20Liberty’s%20and%20Privacy%20International’s%20claims%2015th%20November%202
013.pdf>.
111 The Guardian, ‘MI5 Feared GCHQ Went “Too Far” Over Phone and Internet Monitoring’, 
(2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/23/mi5-feared-gchq-went-too-far>. 
112 supra note 40.
113 supra note 42.
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exercise of surveillance and was therefore not ‘in accordance with the law’. Its successor, 
RIPA, is strikingly similar and will almost certainly fall foul of Article 8 on the same grounds.
Likewise, s 702 FAA, designed ostensibly for an interception of foreign targets, does 
not satisfy the legality requirement, as it establishes a regime that allows the US 
government to conduct mass surveillance, including the communications of American 
citizens, without a warrant, or particularized suspicion.115
 Clearly, the scope of what has been collected under Article 8(4) RIPA and s 702 FAA 
is unclear, as both statutes confer very broad discretion on the state agencies, allowing 
them not only to conduct untargeted surveillance abroad, but also to circumvent the 
requirements for legitimate use of surveillance powers at home. In that sense both 
provisions lack the necessary qualities of law.
(b) Legitimate Aim
A state must justify any interference on the basis of the specified legitimate aim. Article 17 
ICCPR does not enumerate an exhaustive list of public policy objectives that may form the 
basis of such a justification. Nevertheless, the prevention, suppression and investigation of 
acts of terrorism have been held to amount to a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 
17.116  
Unlike Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8(2) ECHR does provide a list of legitimate aims, 
among them the interest of national security and economic well being of the country.117 As a 
general principle, the existence of legislation granting powers of secret surveillance over 
communications including email is necessary in the interest of national security.118  In 
addition, it has been held that the enhanced capacity of states to monitor all internet traffic 
has been recognized as a valid ‘basis of an arguable justification for mass surveillance of the 
Internet’ in the interest of prevention and suppression of global acts of terrorism.119 
However, states do not enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their 
jurisdictions to secret surveillance and may not, in the name of the struggle against 
espionage and terrorism adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.120 Indeed, such 
measures are only tolerable in so far as the means provided for by the legislation to achieve 
these aims remain within the bounds of what is necessary in a democratic society.121 Lately, 
114 Liberty v UK, supra note 92. The case concerned the interception of communications 
authorised by the Ministry of Defence of Liberty and other human rights groups between 
1990-97.  
115 Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA): Its Illegal and Unconstitutional Use’ 
<https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/702_one_pager_final_adv.pdf.>. The FISC approved 
PRISM orders directed at specific companies have been sued to access Americans’ 
communications, so long as the order targets at least 51% of foreign people. 
116 Report of the Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 78 para 33.
117 Art 8, supra note 3.
118 Klass v Germany, supra note 89 para 48; Leander v Sweden, supra note 95 para 59.
119 Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 79 para 34.
120 Klass v Germany, supra note 89, para 49.
121 ibid, paras 46 and 49.
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in Zakharov the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber rejected surveillance authorised on ‘national, 
military, economic or ecological security grounds’ for being insufficient, requiring that any 
authorisation must be based on a ‘reasonable suspicion against a person concerned’.122 This 
means that when authorising surveillance measure, an authorising body must be capable of 
verifying whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, 
committing, or having committed criminal act or acts endangering national security.123 The 
‘reasonable suspicion’ approach was not only endorsed, but also further elaborated on by 
the ECtHR in Szabo earlier this year. The phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ now 
requires that any secret surveillance must be strictly necessary in two senses: (a) as a 
general consideration for the safeguarding of democratic institutions; and (b) as a particular 
consideration for the obtaining of vital intelligence in an individual operation.124 
The official justifications by the US and UK governments regarding untargeted foreign 
surveillance are rare and mainly based on national security grounds, in particular fighting 
and preventing terrorism and crime.125 As such these grounds are too broad and unspecific 
and therefore do not meet the criteria of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Instead, they bear all the 
hallmarks of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the ECHtR is particularly adverse to.126 
(c) Necessity and Proportionality of Mass Surveillance
States must demonstrate that any interference with the right to privacy under Article 17 
ICCPR and Article 8(2) ECHR is a necessary means to achieving a legitimate aim. Establishing 
that the interference is necessary requires from a state to show not only that the 
interference with a person’s right meets a pressing social need, but that it is also 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.127 This means that the interference cannot be 
greater than is necessary to address that pressing social need.128 Additionally, the measure 
122 Zakharov v Russia, supra note 98 para 260.
123 ibid.
124 Szabo v Hungary, supra note 99 para 98.
125 US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ’Hearing of 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on How Disclosed NSA Programs 
Protect Americans and Why Disclosure Aids Our Adversaries’ (2013)
< https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=739351>;The Huffington Post, ‘Barak Obama Justifies 
PRISM NSA Surveillance Programme Saying it Has Saved Lives’ (2013) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/06/19/prism-obama-germany-
merkel_n_3464613.html>.
126 Vinci Construction and GTM Genic Civil et Services v France (App No 63629/10 & 
60567/10) (2015). ‘Fishing expeditions’ are searches, or investigations undertaken in the 
hope of discovering information, whereby data in mined to identify possible 
terrorist/criminal activity rather than the actual activity. In Vinci the ECtHR held that 
unannounced inspections, searches and seizures of computer files for the purposes of an 
official investigation by the French competition authority violated Article 6(1)-right to fair 
trial, as well as Article 8.
127 Bernadette Rainey et al., The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 325.
128 ibid.
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in question must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those, which might achieve their 
protective function.129  
In the case of intrusion into internet privacy rights, proportionality involves balancing 
the extent of the intrusion against the specific benefits accruing to investigations 
undertaken by public authority in the public interest.130 The principle of proportionality 
seems not to be satisfied in cases of the use of mass surveillance programmes by both the 
US and the UK authorities under Article 17 ICCPR. One reason is that the official success rate 
in fighting/preventing terrorism appears insignificant in relation to the scale of surveillance 
operations. The figures declared by the Obama Administration justifying their use of PRISM 
set the number of prevented terrorist threats at at least fifty,131 but these claims have been 
subsequently discredited. In Klayman v Obama132 the court found that the US government 
was unable to ‘cite a single case in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection 
actually stopped an imminent terrorist attack’.133 In addition, US President’s Review Group 
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies evidenced that mass surveillance 
impedes law enforcement efforts and recommended that significant steps should be taken 
to protect privacy of non-US persons.134 In particular, it refuted the Administration’s claims 
regarding the number of lives saved as a result of metadata collection, advising that the bulk 
surveillance programmes should be shut down.135 Similarly, according to the PACE report, 
mass surveillance does not appear to have contributed to the prevention of terrorist 
attacks, contrary to earlier assertions made by senior intelligence officials.136 
Similar conclusion can be reached in the light of the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding 
the assessment of proportionality. In Leander v Sweden137 the ECtHR accepted that states 
should enjoy wide discretion, both in assessing the existence of a pressing social need and in 
choosing the means of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. 
However, in Klass138 and later in Zakharov, 139 the ECtHR emphasised that states do not enjoy 
129 UNHRC General Comment No. 34, supra note 106 para 34.
130  supra note 79, para 51.
131 Joan McCarter, ‘President Obama: ‘Lives Have Been Saved’ (2013) 
<http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/6/19/1217312/-President-Obama-Lives-have-been-
saved-by-NSA-surveillance>.
132 Klayman v Obama 957 F Supp 2d. 1 (2013).
133 Reuters, ‘US Court Hands Win to NSA over Metadata Collection’ (2015) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-surveillance-idUSKCN0QX1QM20150828>. 
The decision that the NSA mass collection of phone metadata was unconstitutional was 
reversed by the US Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia in August 2015.
134 supra note 18.
135 ibid, Recommendation 4:
We recommend that, as a general rule, and without senior policy review, 
the government should not be permitted to collect and store all mass, undigested,
non-public personal information about individuals to enable future queries and data-
mining for foreign intelligence purposes. Any program involving government 
collection or storage of such data must be narrowly tailored to serve an important
government interest. 
136 supra note 6.
137 supra note 95.
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an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdictions to secret surveillance 
and may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever 
measures they deem appropriate. Mass data collection programmes therefore appear to 
offend against the requirement that intelligence agencies must select the measure that is 
the least intrusive on human rights and thus undermine the very essence of the right to 
privacy.140
It could therefore be said that the use of PRISM, Tempora and other such programmes 
do not seem to have legal basis in domestic law, fail to satisfy the requirement of legitimate 
aim and are disproportionately intrusive. For these reasons they are in all probability 
unlawful under Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR. 
The Future of Mass Surveillance
The future of the internet as a medium for free and open exchange of information globally 
has been seriously undermined, as evidenced by the political fallout. To begin with, 
revelations that the NSA spied on even its closest allies have affected state-to-state 
relationships, with the Brazilian, German and Indian authorities expressing their outrage in 
the immediate aftermath.141 The trend for more ‘technological sovereignty’ and ‘data 
nationalization’ has also intensified, with both Brazil and the European Union recently 
announcing plans to lay a $185 million fibre-optic cables between them to thwart US 
surveillance. 142 
A number of international and regional institutions have also acted swiftly in 
condemning mass surveillance. The UN General Assembly (UN GA), the Human Rights 
Council and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have gone 
to a considerable effort to address these issues. The UN GA adopted two Resolutions on the 
right to privacy- 68/167143 and 69/166,144 both affirming that people’s rights protected offline 
should also be safeguarded on line. The OHCHR presented a report in June 2014, which 
138 supra note 89 para 48. The ECtHR recognized that ‘democratic societies nowadays find 
themselves threatened by highly sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism, with 
the result that the State must be able, in order effectively to counter such threats, to 
undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction’.
139 Zakharov, supra note 98 para 49.
140  supra note 79, para 52. 
141 supra note 6, paras 104-105.Brazilin President Rousseff has strongly condemned NSA 
surveillance at an address before the UN General Assembly in September 2013, whilst 
German Der Spiegel accused the NSA of ‘turning the internet into a weapons system’ 
following the revelations of spying on the Chancellor Merkel and other high-profile 
Germans. On 2 July 2014 India summoned a senior US diplomat over reports that the US 
had authorised the NSA to spy on the ruling party, the BJP, in 2010 when it was in the 
opposition.
142 ibid, para 108.
143 UNGA Res 68/167 (18 December 2013) UN Doc A/RES/68/167.
144 UNGA Res 69/166 (18 December 2014) UN Doc A/RES/69/166.
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spelled out the violations of privacy in the context of Article 17 ICCPR, stating that 
governmental surveillance ‘is emerging as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional 
measure’.145 In 2015 the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 28/16 appointing a 
Special Rapporteur on the rights to privacy, Professor Joseph Cannataci,  with the mandate 
to report on alleged violations of this right including in connection with the challenges 
arising from new technologies.146 
(a) Regulation of the Activities of Intelligence Agencies
The first concrete proposal to date from an international organization to address the 
working methods of intelligence services in the sphere of digital communications came from 
the Council of Europe (CoE) in the form of the Intelligence Codex.  Four simple rules were 
suggested for governing co-operation among the intelligence agencies. First, any form of 
mutual political, economic espionage must be prohibited without exception.147 Secondly, 
any intelligence activity on the territory of another member state would only be carried out 
with that state’s approval and within a statutory framework, that is for a specific reason of 
preventing crime/terrorism.148 Thirdly, the tracking, analysing and storing of mass data is 
strictly prohibited if that data is from non-suspected individual from a friendly state. Only 
information pertaining to legitimately targeted individuals may be collected on an 
exceptional basis for specific individual purposes, whilst any data that is stored, but not 
needed must be immediately destroyed.149 Finally, the intelligence agencies would be 
banned from forcing telecommunication and internet companies to grant them unfettered 
access to their massive databases of personal data  without a court order.150 
There can be no doubt that a binding treaty, such as the proposed Codex is 
necessary. The Council of Europe has provided a number of reasons as to why such an 
instrument is desirable. Among them, rebuilding trust among transatlantic partners, 
member states of the CoE, as well as between citizens and their governments was 
considered to be of outmost importance. 151  Moreover, ‘the political problems caused by 
“spying on friends” and the possible collusion between intelligence services for the 
circumvention of national restrictions show the need for states to come up with a generally 
accepted “codex” for intelligence agencies that would put and end to unfettered mass 
surveillance and confine surveillance practices to what is strictly needed for legitimate 
security purposes’.152 
That being the case, the question is how feasibly is it that such a treaty be adopted? 
So far states showed no real appetite to regulate peacetime espionage (be it in its 
traditional or cyber form) through an internationally binding treaty.153 As a consequence, 
145 UNCHR, Twenty-seventh Session ‘Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ (30 June 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/37.
146 UNGA Res 28/16 (24 March 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28L.27. 
147  supra note 45, 50. 
148 ibid.
149 ibid.
150 ibid.
151 ibid, para 13, 8.
152 ibid, para 115, 50. 
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international law has been rather ambivalent regarding regulation of electronic surveillance, 
which falls within the broader concept of peacetime espionage.154 However, there has been 
a marked shift in focus in relation to who is the subject of surveillance. Historically, signals 
intelligence efforts were concentrated on gathering data about decision making in foreign 
governments.155 Colleting information on private individuals was not wide-spread and also 
costly. Consequently, public pressure to curtail espionage was minimal as it was not seen to 
effect average citizens abroad.156 This has dramatically changed and may encourage at least 
some states to consider putting on express legislative footing how, when and where foreign 
governments may intercept their citizens’ communications. However, a global international 
legal framework for surveillance coming to fruition any time soon is very much in doubt. 
This is compounded by a lack of blueprint that can serve as a yardstick for such a treaty. This 
does not necessarily mean that a multilateral treaty could not be achieved on a smaller 
scale, originating in the Council of Europe. The CoE has a successful track record regarding 
the negotiation of international treaties, as demonstrated by the Convention on Cybercrime 
2001 (the Budapest Convention)157 and Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108),158 both dealing with 
activities conducted in the cyber environment. They begun life as regional, European 
instruments, but in time became international, albeit not universal, since they allow for 
accession by non-European countries. Thus, the Budapest Convention has been ratified by 
49 parties, among them four non-Council of Europe states who signed it (the US, Canada, 
Japan and South Africa) and five, including the US which also ratified it.159 Similarly, the 
‘globalization’ of Convention 108 beyond its European origins has been underway since the 
start of this decade, when Uruguay acceded to it in 2013.160 The expansion of Convention 
108 is set to continue with Mauritius depositing its instruments of accession this year and 
other four non-European countries (Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia) at various 
stages of the process.161 The Intelligence Codex too could not only become a regional treaty, 
but also provide an opportunity to other non-European states to become a party to it and 
thus have wider than Europe reach. 
153 For an overview see Deeks, supra note 5. 
154 The US FISA defines electronic surveillance to include ‘the acquisition by an electronic, 
mechanical, or other surveillance devices of the contents of any wire communication to or 
from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such 
acquisition occurs within the Unite States’. 50 USC §1801(f)(2).
155 supra note 5, p 23. 
156 ibid.
157 Cybercrime Convention [2001] European Treaty Series No 185.
158 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data [1981] European Treaty Series No 108.
159 Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185 Convention on 
Cybercrime Status as of 31/07/2016. The other states are Australia, Canada, Dominican 
Republic, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Panama and Sri Lanka.
160 Graham Greenleaf, ‘Balancing Globalization’s Benefits and Commitments: Accession to 
Data Protection Convention 108 by Countries Outside Europe’ (2016) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801054>.
161 ibid.
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Thus far, the Intelligence Codex has met with only one, unfavourable response from 
the 47 CoE member states from the Netherlands. In the absence of more reactions from the 
member states it is difficult to speculate what the future of the Codex may be. If the 
proposal fails, an alternative solution could be a voluntary Intelligence Codex.162 Such soft 
law option would also have a strong effect, ‘because those that do not abide by it could be 
accused of wrongful actions by their allies, thus eroding their credibility as cooperation 
partners’.163 However, as demonstrated by the now annulled Safe Harbour agreement, non-
legally binding schemes are easier to circumvent than hard law instruments.164 Undoubtedly, 
a multilateral binding agreement would be more effective to close loopholes states can 
currently exploit in order to circumvent legal limits placed on their intelligence programmes, 
especially in relation to ‘collusion for circumvention’, which still allows intelligence agencies 
to push the boundaries of their data collection powers at home by relying on data collected 
by their allies or third parties.165
What could be its advantage though over and above the existing international 
human rights architecture? There are at least two reasons in support of the Codex, first the 
need for up to date norms under Article 17 ICCPR and secondly, to supplement the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 8 ECHR. These points will be discussed below.  
(i) The Need to Modernise Article 17 ICCPR 
Needles to say, each state should prefer a world in which its officials and citizens were less 
often subject to foreign surveillance.166 However, to achieve reduced surveillance through an 
internationally binding treaty states must have clearly defined norms. This at present 
appears lacking, as the existing international law norms under Article 17 ICCPR, in particular 
its General Comment No. 16 issued in 1988, have not kept pace with the rapid 
developments in surveillance and information technologies. As a consequence, the law on 
privacy is outdated and needs to be modernized. 
The past practice of the HRC set a precedent for revising or replacing general 
comments.167 The HRC has been motivated by the need to provide greater detail and more 
authoritative guidance on a content of a particular article, as well as the need to ensure that 
162 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Memorandum by Mr Pieter Omtzigt, Rapporteur’ AS/Jur 
(2015), para 117.
163 ibid.
164 Case C-362/14 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015]ECJ. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union held that all data transfers from Facebook’s Irish subsidiary 
to its US headquarters under the EU-US Safe Harbour agreement were unsafe, because the 
US law did not offer sufficient protection against surveillance by that country’s public 
authorities.
165 supra note 163.
166 supra note 5, 21. 
167 supra note 46. In 2011 General Comment No. 10 (written in 1983) was replaced with 
General Comment No. 34 on Article 19, protecting the right to freedom of expression, whilst 
in 2013 General Comment No.8 issued in 1982 was replaced with General Comment No. 35 
on Article 9, protecting liberty and security of the person.
Eliza Watt
16.10.2016
22
general comments reflect the changing realities and incorporate developments in the law.168 
General Comment No. 16 is no exception. Although it sets out the core concepts contained 
in Article 17, it has lagged behind the technological developments in modern 
communications and surveillance practices. Consequently, new general comment on Article 
17 ICCPR must provide explicit articulation of what is the right to privacy of communications 
in the digital sphere and spell out the content of this right to ensure its effective protection 
and enforcement. Currently General Comment No. 16 shortcomings relate to the lack of 
explicit recognition of such matters as banning untargeted, mass surveillance,169 bulk 
metadata collection and retention;170 protecting metadata;171 intelligence services/law 
enforcement access to communications data held by third party service providers and 
internet companies including in a ‘cloud’; the relationship between private companies and 
governments;172 biometric data gathering (through for example finger printing, facial 
recognition software) and transborder access to non-publically available data circumventing 
the requirements of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. In addition, some matters must 
be settled beyond doubt, such as extraterritorial application of human rights and equal 
treatment of citizens and foreigners, as well as specifying the circumstances when the right 
to privacy may be restricted. 173 
(b) The Need to Supplement the ECtHR Jurisprudence under Article 8 ECHR
The PACE report indicated that the Intelligence Codex would adopt the safeguards devised 
by the European Court of Human Rights for surveillance.174 However, these safeguards 
provide only minimum standards175 that member states must adhere to and need to be 
reinforced by detailed rules in at least four areas, namely (a) legality- in relation to the so 
called ‘contact chaining’; (b) legitimate aim; (c) judicial authorisation; and (d) complaints 
mechanism- user notification.
168 ibid.
169 Zakharov, supra note 98; Szabo, supra note 99.
170 Joint Cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitilinger and Others 
[2014] ECJ. The CJEU declared that the EU Data Retention Directive, which compelled all 
internet and telecommunication service provides operating in Europe to obtain and retain 
subscribers’ incoming and outgoing telephone and internet metadata for the period of six 
months to two years was invalid. 
171 Copland v the United Kingdom (App No 62617/00) (2007) ECHR; Malone supra note 98; 
UNHRC Report by the Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (17 April 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/40.
172 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, supra note 164.
173 Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue, supra note 153 para 29; UNHRC Report by Special 
Rapporteur Martin Scheinin on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism (28 December 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/13/37 para 11. The Special Rapporteurs suggested that the limitations to the right to 
privacy are subject to the test of permissible limitations set forth by the HRC in its General 
Comment No. 27 to Article 12 (freedom of movement).
174 PACE Report, supra note 6 para 97, 80.
175 ibid 57. 
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(i) Legality
In such cases Klass,176 Malone,177 Weber,178 Liberty,179 Rotaru v Romania,180 Zakharov181 and 
Szabo,182 the Strasbourg Court has developed minimum standards, which domestic law must 
meet in order to be compatible with Article 8 outlined in part 4(a) above,183 among them the 
requirement to specify the categories of people liable to have their communication 
intercepted.  In gathering information, state authorities often build a human network 
around an individual of interest to them by gathering telephone and/or internet metadata 
related to other persons with whom that individual may be in contact and who are usually 
one or two stops (‘hops’) away from him/her. This is known as ‘contact chaining’. National 
legislation would usually set out these powers in terms of ‘relevance’ for the investigation of 
terrorism or crime.184  The Strasbourg Court has not yet addressed this issue in the context 
of interception of internet metadata,185 yet in this case the ‘relevance’ criterion gives 
potential for expanding the net of surveillance greatly to cover huge numbers of people 
without any connection whatsoever to crime or terrorism.186 Contact chaining must 
therefore be regulated by placing strict limits on the power to query collected bulk 
metadata. 
176 supra note 88.
177 supra note 89.
178 supra note 95.
179 supra note 91.
180 Rotaru v Romania (App No 28341/95) (2000) ECHR 2000-V.
181 supra note 97.
182 supra note 98.
183 supra note 97. These include: 
(1) the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; 
(2) definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped 
and a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; 
(3)  the procedures to be followed for examining, using and storing of data 
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other 
parties; and 
(4) the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes 
destroyed.  
184 Some jurisdictions, for example in the US, the access to stored telephony metadata will 
be granted on the basis of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ individually approved by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under s 215 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
185 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission), ‘The 
Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies’ (20-21 March 2015), para 98, 81. The 
Venice Commission explained contact chaining in the following terms:
The bulk metadata are analysed to identify communications patterns. This usually 
takes the form of checking whether previously identified suspect telephone numbers 
(X) are in contact with other numbers (Y) and then whether Y is in contact with other 
numbers (Z).
186 ibid, para 10, 57.
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(ii) Legitimate Aim
The Zakharov and Szabo cases illustrate the Court’s acknowledgement that the legal 
threshold of ‘national security’ is dangerously broad especially in the context of 
mobile/electronic communications, which contrasts with its earlier more permissive 
approach in Weber and Kennedy. The ECtHR now favours a stringent test based on 
reasonable suspicion and this criterion should be adopted in the Codex, as a legal 
requirement for all surveillance powers. As for  allowing the collection of signals intelligence 
for ‘economic well being of the country’, it has been feared that this may give rise to the 
suspicion of economic espionage.187 The problem is that there seems to be no limits set out 
by the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding when data may be collected pursuant to this ground. 
One view was that to avoid nations acting for nefarious purposes cloaked in the ‘economic 
well being’, this criterion must be accompanied by clear prohibition of economic espionage, 
buttressed by effective oversight and prohibitions on letting government departments, or 
administrative agencies concerned with promoting trade, task the signals intelligence 
agencies.188 
(iii) Judicial Authorisation
In order to comply with the ECHR a secret surveillance programme must be subject to 
independent supervision, which may be either judicial or non-judicial.189 In its past cases, the 
ECtHR held that judicial authorisation is ‘in principle desirable and ‘offer[s] the best 
guarantee of independence, impartiality and a proper procedures’,190 but stopped short of 
requiring this in all circumstances. In Klass the ECtHR found that oversight by a non-judicial 
body was allowed, where that body is sufficiently ‘independent of the authorities carrying 
out the surveillance’.191 Yet,  the issue of impartiality in cases where authorisation has been 
in the guise of a non-judicial bodies, such as an official of the Post Office, gave the Court 
reasons for concern.192 An opportunity to require that all states must provide that only 
judicial authorisation would suffice arose lately in Zakharov, but the Court held that ‘control 
by an independent body, normally a judge with special expertise, should be the rule and 
substitute solution, the exception warranting close scrutiny’.193 Szabo was yet another 
confirmation that judicial control of secret surveillance is preferable, but not obligatory.194 In 
187 ibid.
188 ibid para 73, 73.
189 Weber supra note 95; Klass supra note 88; Zakharov supra note 97; Szabo supra note 98.
190 Klass, supra note 88 para 87.
191 ibid para 56.
192 Kopp v Switzerland (App No 23224/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 91, para 74:
It is, to say the least, astonishing that [the] task [of authorising interceptions] should 
be assigned to an official of the Post Office’s legal department, who is a member of 
the executive, without supervision by an independent judge…
193 Zakharov, supra note 97 para 77.
194 Szabo, supra note 98 para 75. The ECtHR opined that judicial authorisation offers the best 
guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure, since the supervision of a 
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the sphere of mass surveillance, the key defect therefore of the current authorisation 
regime is the Court’s repeated reticence to make the requirement of judicial authorisation 
mandatory across jurisdictions. 
(iv) Complaints Mechanism
 Under Article 13 ECHR individuals have a right to an effective remedy in their 
national courts in cases where a public authority has infringed their Convention rights.195 
Part of this entitlement is the right of citizens to be informed of their data being collected 
and/or that they have been subject of surveillance, known as user notification.196 However, 
the issue of whether and when an individual may expect to be informed is far from settled. 
In Klass, the ECtHR found that states are not required to disclose that they have ordered or 
conducted surveillance in a particular case, nor must they notify a person after the 
surveillance has ceased.197 The ECtHR considered that is was not feasible in practice to 
require post interception notification in all cases.198 In the subsequent cases the ECtHR 
showed a clear tendency towards the establishment of this as a right. 199  For example, in 
Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria200 the ECtHR held that the missing notification of the individual after 
surveillance violated both Article 8 and Article 13 ECHR, but fell short of finding that 
notification was a necessary requirement of domestic surveillance laws in general, stating 
that authorities should issue a notification to an individual who had been secretly 
monitored.201   
Conclusion
The extent of mass foreign surveillance exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013 reinforced the 
need to safeguard human rights in the online environment. Whilst the political dust on mass 
surveillance is slowly settling down, what has become apparent is a series of shortfalls in the 
international legal framework on privacy of communications when applied to the digital 
sphere. Although in principle privacy laws apply therein, Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR 
are either outdated and/or require additional standards, matching the demands of modern 
gathering of signals intelligence. Equally, the move towards greater surveillance powers in 
member of the executive (the Minister of Justice) did not provide the necessary guarantees 
against abuse.
195 ECHR, supra note 9 art 13. 
196 Necessary and Proportionate, ‘Global Legal Analysis. Background and Supporting 
International Legal Analysis for the International Principles on the Application of Human 
Rights to Communications Surveillance ’(2014) 
<https://necessaryandproportionate.org/global-legal-analysis>, 24.
197 Klass, para 88.
198 ibid para 58.
199 Weber, supra note 95; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and 
Ekimdzhiev and Bulgaria (App No 62540/00) (2007); Kennedy, supra note 96; Uzun v 
Germany (App No 36623/05) (2010); Zakharov, supra note 97.
200 ibid.
201 supra note 181, 24.
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some European countries and the US as a result of an increased number of terrorist attacks 
suggests that the calls from the UN organizations and human rights bodies have been 
ignored. Yet, mass untargeted surveillance does not work in preventing serious crime and 
terrorism and is unlawful under international human rights law. This problem remains 
inadequately dealt with, despite the calls from the UN General Assembly and the Human 
Rights Council to put a stop to these practices. This therefore calls for a more robust 
solution, such as the one proposed by the Council of Europe in the form of a multilateral 
binding treaty that aims to ban all forms of economic, political and diplomatic espionage. 
This paper not only came in support of such a hard law solution, but also proposed that 
foreign untargeted cyber surveillance conducted on unspecified grounds and without an 
independent judicial authorisation, must be prohibited.  
